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This paper presents a selective survey of issues relevant to the choice of nominal anchors
for monetary policy. Section I reviews long price-level histories for the United Kingdom and
United States, whichrevealthat the price level behaved very differently following WWII in these
countries than it had done in previous post-war experiences. In particular following WWII the
responsibilities of monetary policy expanded to encompass a business-cycle stabilization role and
the nominal anchor shifted from the fixed anchor or price-level stability to the moving anchor
of inflation-rate stability. The remaining sections of the paper review, in the context of a variety
of models, some of the considerations that are relevant to setting the average inflation rate in
countries without a fixed nominal anchor.
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Summary
A nominal anchor is a nominal variable that is the target for
monetary policy. In this paper we distinguish three types of such anchors.
First, when monetary policy fixes the currency price of a commodity or a
group of commodities we refer to such an anchor as a fixed nominal anchor,
with the gold standard as a famous example. Second, and more generally,
when monetary policy targets the growth of a nominal magnitude such as the
price level, a monetary aggregate or nominal income for example, building on
an inherited past, we refer to such an anchor as a moving nominal anchor.
The third arrangement, which is not completely distinct from the previous
two, aims at fixing or managing the price of one or more countries'
currencies in terms of another country's currency. Countries entering into
such a system are agreeing to share a more basic nominal anchor such as one
of the countries' inflation target and the nominal systems in those
countries inherit properties of the underlying nominal anchor.
Before WWII and the great depression many countries adhered to a
commodity standard, on and off, with the gold/silver standard the best-known
example. During this period countries following such a standard experienced
long-run price stability; inflations, which accompanied wars, were followed
by equivalently-sized deflations after the wars. In the period following
the great depression and WWII monetary policy was often placed into a more
activist role and was expected to make an effort to help stabilize the real
economy as well as to deliver politically-tolerable inflation performance.
Much attention in recent years has been directed toward:(1) the
appropriate design of monetary policy using theoretical arguments and data-
based simulations; (2) the role of monetary policy rules; and (3) the
ability of the private sector to exploit certain monetary policy rules as
in, for example, a speculative attack on a fixed exchange rate rule. We
review selected aspects of this literature drawing out features that we
think may be robust across industrial countries and possibly important for
their average inflation-rate choice.
Finally, it should be emphasized that in the actual conduct of
monetary policy, governments and central banks do not generally behave in a
manner that can be summarized easily in a mathematical equation. Almost
always, some degree of judgement is exercised by a country's monetary
authority. Nevertheless, the conduct of monetary policy is not random and
undisciplined; it is governed by reasonably well-defined objectives, in the
context of a broad understanding of how monetary policy affects the real
economy, the financial system, and the price level. In the end, it is the
fact that there is something systematic about the conduct of monetary
policy, and about its effects, that allows economic analysis to shed some
light, at least potentially, on the effects of alternative monetary policies
in supplying a nominal anchor for the economic system. The practical
importance and implications of any such analytical exercise, of course, need
to be interpreted with an appropriate degree of caution.I. Introduction
Episodes of various monetary standards, guidelines and sometimes
excesses present themselves in every country's history. Monetary
arrangements and their price-level results have varied from the long-term
average price-level stability of metallic standards adopted by many
countries for long periods before World ¶Jar II, to the hyperinflations in
some countries after World War I, during which prices rose at the rate of
50 percent or more per month never to return to the far-distant
pre-hyperinflation level. In the gold-standard era the fixed currency price
of gold provided an anchor to which prices returned after periods of
inflation. Post-WWII economies have not showii a tendency or a desire to
return to historical price levels, instead in many post-WIT economies the
inflation rate plays the part played previously by a fixed nominal gold
price. In this set of economies the inflation rate rather than the price
level tends to return to normal levels after bouts of moderately high
inflation. In another set of economies low inflation has not been monetary
policy's target. In these economies monetary policy is not directed at a
nominal target. Instead, the monetary authority has a substantial revenue-
producing role, which results in periods of very high inflation alternating
with attempts at reform.
These experiences illustrate different nominal anchors for monetary
policy, where a nominal anchor is a nominal variable that is the target for
monetary policy. jj/Threenominal anchor types were common during the
last two centuries. The first type of nominal anchor fixes the currency
price of one or more commodities. The metallic standards in which many
countries linked their monies to gold or silver or a combination of the two
for long periods before World War II are the prime examples of such a
nominal anchor. In this instance the nominal anchor is the fixed currency
price of a standardized metallic unit and such standards are known as
commodity standards. We refer to this type of anchor as a fixed nominal
anchor because under such standards there was a general tendency for the
level of nominal, prices to return to some fixed normal level over long
periods.
The second type of nominal anchor comes from a monetary authority's
attempting to hit a moving nominal target. Examples of this sort of anchor
are monetary targeting strategies, inflation targets or nominal income
targets all of which aim at nominal targets that are based on desired growth
of a nominal variable building on the inherited past. Such arrangements are
best thought of as inflation standards since the resulting time path for
prices and other nominal magnitudes shows inflation and rates-of-change of
other nominal variables returning to baselines over the medium-to
longer-term, but with no tendency for the general level of prices to return
to some long-term normal level. We refer to this type of system as having a
moving nominal anchor.
j/ See Adams and Gros (1986), Bruno (1986), and Patinkin (1993).-2-
The third type of arrangement, which is not really completely
distinct from the previous two, aims at fixing, or managing the price of a
country's currency in terms of another country's currency. These exchange
rate arrangements, of which there are many varieties, sometimes involve, for
example, almost fixed parities, fixed devaluation schedules, fairly wide
exchange rate target zones or complicated rules for different kinds of
transactions. The nature of all of these exchange rate arrangements is that
the countries joining in a fixed or controlled parity arrangement are
agreeing to share a nominal anchor, with one or more of the participating
countries targeting that anchor and others targeting an exchange rate. The
countries in Bretton Woods Agreement shared the post-WIt U.S. inflation
experience and countries in the Exchange Rate Mechanism portion of the
European Monetary System also share a common inflation experience. A shared
nominal anchor system can allow a combination of different inflation
standards across countries when one of the countries adopts a fixed exchange
rate adjustment schedule relative to the partner currency. Because a shared
nominal anchor inherits the main features of the underlying nominal anchor
with which it is associated, this paper will not devote separate attention
to this derivative form of nominal anchor until we study specific policy
rules in Section 3.
These monetary anchor regimes differ markedly from monetary regimes
in which the monetary authority provides a substantial portion of government
revenue. In such systems monetary expansion is directed primarily toward
government command of resources instead of being directed at nominal
targets. These systems effectively have no nominal anchor and often
experience high and variable inflation rates.
In this paper, we discuss nominal anchors and monetary policy in the
following three sections. Section I presents and interprets long
price-level histories in the United States and the United Kingdom. In this
section, it is seen that price levels under the gold standard had a tendency
to return to a fixed level-- inflations were followed by equivalently-sized
deflations. 3]Withthe end of the gold standards, following the Creat
Depression and WIt, industrial countries moved to an inflation standard in
which the nominal anchor for most industrial countries became inherited
j/ Great Britain was on an effectively gold standard after Isaac Newton,
as director of the Mint, applied Gresham's law and undervalued gold relative
to silver and thereby drove silver coinage out of circulation. The United
States was formally on a hi-metallic standard (which was suspended during
the Civil War and until 1879). Cold replaced silver as the circulating
medium in the United States after the world price of gold relative to silver
fell below the U.s. mint ratio in the pre-Civil War period. In 1873,
Congress eliminated the hi-metallic standard and provided for the resumption
of a gold standard on January 1, 1879. For simplicity, however, we shall
refer to the "gold standard" as describing the metallic standard of both the
United States and Great Britain in the era before World War II.-3-
nominal magnitudes coupled with a fairly low political tolerance for
inflation. Section II presents data on the simple correlation, over a wide
cross section of countries in the period since 1960 of average inflation
rates and average seignorage revenue collected by the monetary authorities.
In this section, it is argued that the setting of the average inflation rate
is a problem in political economy that has been reasonably well solved in
industrial countries through investment in noninflationary
revenue-collecting machinery.
Section III pursues some aspects of monetary policy that go beyond
the setting of the average inflation rate and involve the relationship
between inflation, monetary policy and economic stabilization. Out of the
many contributions in this area, this section reviews two concerning
inflation expectations and policy rules that set the stage for many later
developments. As applications of these ideas we then examine the
performance of some specific monetary policy rules, each adopting a
different moving nominal anchor, in a variety of econometric simulation
models. Finally we then study the idea that policy rules in general and
some nominal anchor policies in particular are temporary. Some concluding
remarks and a Technical Appendix follow Section III.
II. Lone Price-Level Histories
This section reviews long price-level histories for the United
Kingdom and the United States. j/ Figure 1, Panel A, depicts the U.K.
price level. 2! The Panel begins in 1800, which followed a period of
great turmoil in the British financial system. Effectively the British were
off the gold standard during the Napoleonic Era and did not return to specie
until 1819. From 1820 through the early days of WVI, the United Kingdom
stuck firmly to the gold standard and experienced nearly 100 years of
comparative price-level stability. Note, however, that while the U.K. price
level in 1820 nearly matches that in 1920, the time path was a volatile
one- -adopting a gold standard did not produce year-to-year price stability.
The United Kingdom left the gold standard during WI and the price level
more than doubled between 1914 and 1920. Following the war, the United
Kingdom painfully deflated until 1925 and was able to resume a form of the
gold standard with gold priced at its prewar parity level.
The British experience with the gold standard ended during the Great
Depression with the Cold Standard (Amendment) Act of 1931, which ended the
Bank of England's commitment to sell gold at a fixed price in exchange
sterling bank notes. Once the British left the gold standard, the fixed
JJ Also presented, in the appendix for comparison, are long price-level
histories for France, Italy and Spain, see Figure Al.
2! The data used in this section are Wholesale Price Indices taken from
Mitchell (1992) for the period prior to 1989 and are spliced to comparable
data taken from IFS for 1989-92.-4
nominal anchor was removed from their monetary system and the tendency for
goods prices to return to a baseline level was ended. After 1940, in the
British experience, it was typical for the inflation rate rather than the
price level to return to a normal level.
Panel B of Figure 1 plots the United States price level, beginning in
1800 and ending in 1992. This panel reveals the same remarkable difference
between pre-IJWII and post,WWIT price-level behavior that is seen in panel A.
Following the observations of Klein (1975) and Friedman and Schwartz (1982),
it is apparent from the figure that prices in the prewar period had a
tendency to return to a baseline level, with periods of deflation following
periods of inflation. This phenomenon also encompasses the departure and
subsequent return to the gold standard during and after the U.S. Civil War.
On December 30, 1861, all banks suspended specie payments (i.e., stopped
converting bank deposits into gold) and the U.S. Treasury soon followed
suit, thus effectively removing the US from the gold standard. A massive
increase in the supply of paper money (greenbacks) issued to help finance
the federal government's wartime expenditures then led to the large rise in
the price level during the Civil War years. Following the Civil War, the US
experienced a substantial deflation in preparation for the return to specie
in 1879. Such price-level reversion is a key characteristic of a specie
standard, including a specie standard that is temporarily suspended and
later reinstated at the same parity.
It is readily apparent from Figure 1 that there has been an important
change in the longer-term behavior of the price level in both the United
Kingdom and the United States (and also in other countries not illustrated
in this figure) during the past half-century. The run up in the price level
during WIT was not unusual by past experience; but the failure of the price
level to fall substantially after the war was a key departure from the
experience after WIfl (for both countries), after the U.S. Civil War (for the
United States), and after the Napoleonic Wars (for the United Kingdom).
Moreover, since the depression of the 1930s, the cumulative rise of the
price level has been far greater than in any previous episode of temporary
inflation; and, very strikingly, there has been no period during which the
price level has registered any significant decline in either country. In
particular, the last time the U.S. CPI registered a year-over-year decline
was in 1954, following the Korean War, and this price-level decline amounted
to only one percentage point. Clearly, something fundamental has changed in
the longer-ten behavior of the price level--the inflation rate is
persistently positive and there is no longer any tendency for the price
level to return to a normal level over the long term. Surely now there is
no one who believes that the general price level will ever fall back to
where it was in the 1920s or l930s, or even to where it was in the 1960s or
1970s. Instead, the general price level appears to be headed indefinitely
on an upward course, and the only open question for the longer term is how
rapid will be the average rate of price inflation.
As illustrated in Figure 2, while the inflation rate has remained
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Statos, it has surely not been constant in either country. Specifically,
for both countries, there is a clear upsurge of inflation beginning in the
late 1960s and extending through the 1970s, followed by a noticeable
downturn of inflation during the l980s. In broad terms, this is also the
pattern of inflation in most other industrial countries,
It is important that the downward shift of inflation rates during the
l980s and the early l990s does not appear to be merely a random fluctuation.
Coverniuents of most industrial countries have deliberately adjusted their
economic policies, especially their monetary policies, to reduce annual
percentage rates of inflation generally to the low single digits; and they
have been prepared to adopt and persist in such policies even when their
economies have turned toward recession. The reason for this apparent shift
of policy, in comparison with the l970s, reflects something more than the
absence of supply shocks (especially oil price increases) that contributed
to the earlier upsurge of inflation. As indicated in Figure 3 for the
United Kingdom and the United States, experience has revealed that higher
rates of inflation are not typically associated with stronger economic
growth (or with lower unemployment)--certainly not in any medium-term sense.
As the public generally became aware that higher inflation was associated
with generally poorer, rather than generally better, economic performance,
the popular demand to pursue policies consistent with relatively low
inflation has clearly grown. Covenvuent policy has responded to this
popular demand; and the result is apparent in the general reduction of
inflation rates during the past decade. This popular demand for low
inflation, however, has not induced a return to price-level stability. One
does not hear a popular clamor for aggressive price deflation to restore the
general level of prices to that prevailing in the 1950s or 1960s; and there
is absolutely no evidence that any government is prepared even to
contemplate policies that might produce such a result.
Thus, even from a very crude examination of the facts, it may be
stated with great confidence that there has been a fundamental change in the
nature of the nominal anchor in industrial countries in the post-tJWII era.
There has been a shift away from a commodity-standard anchor that fixes the
longer-term average behavior of the price level, with alternating periods of
offsetting inflation and deflation. There has been a shift to a nominal
anchor that appears to place some limit on the longer-term average behavior
of the rate of price inflation.
This shift in the fundamental nature of the nominal anchor of the
monetary system corresponds to the widespread acceptance of paper money
standards under which national governments (or national central banks) take
responsibility for managing the conduct of monetary policy with some
objective other than the maintenance of a fixed price of some specific
commodity in terms of paper money. As these paper money standards have been
managed during the past half-century, it is clear that the general price
level has lost its tendency (under the previously prevailing metallic
standards) to return to some average level over the long term. Instead, the
objectives that have effectively governed the conduct of national monetary-6-
policies have delivered consistently positive, but not persistently
accelerating, rates of general price inflation. The absence of any
widespread popular demand for a return to tonodity-based money, and the
corresponding general acceptance of "well-managed" paper money standards,
suggest that, for the foreseeable future, the longer-term movement of
general price level is likely to be characterized a positive (and hopefully
quite low) rate of inflation. A key question with respect to this new form
of moving nominal anchor is- -what determines the longer-term average rate of
price inflation?
III. Inflation. Public Finance and Political Economy
The use of a commodity standard in establishing a nominal anchor for
monetary policy might be said to focus primarily on money's traditional
function as a unit of account. A quite different perspective on the nominal
anchor, and one more consistent with a situation of persistently positive
inflation, comes from the treatment of money within the theory of public
finance. From the perspective of public finance, money is like any other
taxable commodity except that taxes on existing money balances are collected
very directly and without much fanfare by the government's issuing more
nominal money balances instead of through a more indirect government-revenue
agency. The real revenue raised by a government from monetary expansion,
real seignorage, is equal to AM/P —p*(M/P)where AM is the change in
government-issued base money, P is the price level and p is the rate of
base-money expansion.
To clarify the connection between js and inflation note that the
income-velocity identity, N*V —P*y,where V is income velocity and y is
real income, implies, for small changes, w —p+ (AV/V) -(Ay/y),where it is
inflation. The velocity growth rate, AV/V, and the real income growth rate,
Ay/y, modify the one-to-one relation between money growth and inflation.
For fixed money growth rates, however, whose levels are unlikely to
influence the rate of change of velocity or output, changes in money growth
translate directly into equivalent changes in inflation.
Changes in money growth, however, do not translate proportionately
into changes in seignorage because an increase in steady inflation raises
the cost of holding real money balances, N/P. and accordingly tends to
reduce the demand to hold such balances. In other words, a higher rate of
monetary expansion tends to increase velocity and therefore tends to lead to
a less than proportional increase in seignorage. Indeed, at sufficiently
high rates of monetary expansion and of inflation, further increases in the
rate of monetary expansion can actually reduce seignorage. In practice,
this effect is often reinforced, to a considerable extent, by the "Tanzi
effect," that is, by the tendency for other sources of government revenue to
erode as the rate of inflation rise.
Leaving aside the Tanzi effect, the theory of public finance
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creation) tax into two elements: the primary burden of the tax, which is
the amount of seignorage raised by this tax; and the excess burden of the
tax, which measures the distortionary effects of inflation in reducing the
efficiency of economic activity by artificially inducing people to economize
on the use of money balances. j/ The traditional measure of the excess
burden of inflation taxation is identified with the area under the money
demand curve beyond the current level of money holding. 2/ In principle,
if a government could raise adequate revenue by imposing distortionless
taxes, there would be no need to impose an inflation tax and thereby incur
the excess burden of this tax. In practice, however, with only
distortionary taxes available to raise necessary revenue, the optimal tax
structure requires that the total excess burden of raising government
revenue be minimized. This, in turn, implies that the marginal excess
burdens of a government's raising revenue from its various sources be
equated. If not, rearranging tax burdens would provide an efficiency
gain.
Estimating efficient tax levels across markets requires a knowledge
of appropriately-constructed demand and supply for all commodities and
services for which taxes are being considered. A full solution of this
problem in an applied situation requires a detailed knowledge of the economy
being studied. As a practical matter, however, it may not be these concerns
highlighted by the theory of publia finance, but rather more down-to-earth
concerns of political economy that determine different countries choices of
an average inflation rate and of how this average inflation rate may evolve
with other economic circumstances.
Industrial countries typically have invested in large and efficient
mechanisms for collecting property, income and value-added or other
consumption taxes. After an upsurge of inflation during the l9lOs, most of
the industrial countries have more recently pursued inflation rates in the
low to medium single-digits, even sometimes at what has appeared to be the
cost of recessions of considerable depth and duration. The explanation of
these developments in terms of the theory of public finance is somewhat
J.j It is in this sense that a tax that cannot be avoided is an efficient
one. It has no excess burden and does not distort private behavior.
2/ This measure is due to Bailey (1956). Friedman (1969) pointed out
that this traditional measure yields an optimal quantity of money equal to
the level of real money balances at which the money demand curve depicting
the demand for real money balances against the nominal interest rate hits
the real money balances axis. In other words the optimum requires a zero
nominal rate of interest or a rate of expected deflation that exactly equals
the real rate of interest.
J Phelps (1973) noted that Friedman's (1969) result, which places the
marginal excess burden on money holding at zero, requires that taxes other
than those on money be raised by a nondistorting lump-sum manner. Since
lump-sum taxes are not available, Phelps argued, the appropriate tax on
money should equate marginal excess burdens that are positive.-8-
problematical. j/ The objections of the electorate to higher rates of
inflation, and the association of higher inflation rates with lower growth
and higher unemployment, may perhaps provide a better explanation of this
shift back toward lower average inflation rates.
In a number of developing countries, with less of an investment in
tax-collecting capital, there has often been much greater reliance on the
inflation tax, as a meats of government finance. This is indicated in
Figure 4 which, in its two panels, provides scatter-plots across a sample of
different countries of average inflation rates (on the vertical axis)
against a seignorage measure (on the horizontal axis). 21
Panel A plots that country-average data over the period 1960-92.
Each data point shows a particular country's average annual inflation rate
over the period and its average annual ratio of seignorage to CDP. The
first point to notice about Panel A is the distinctly positive relation
between the variables. Second, as a broad generalization, when
seignorage/CDP rises above about 2 percent, it appears that a country risks
high inflation, and this risk grows more serious as the ratio continues to
rise.Indeed, this phenomenon is generally most pronounced for countries
with the highest inflation rates, all of which have seignorage/GDP ratios
above 2 percent. These observations have been excluded from the Figure in
order to avoid their appearance dominating the diagram.
Panel B of the Figure repeats the first panel, but for the shorter
period from 1980-92; and the Appendix presents similar diagrams for 1960-69
and for 1970-79. All of these diagrams illustrate strongly the importance
of some sort of nominal anchor that limits the longer-term average inflation
rate. Specifically, when there is an effort to push seignorage as a percent
of CD? above about 1-2 percent on average on the longer term, the risks of
very high inflation escalate dramatically. As many studies have shown,
there appears to be no reliable way to stabilize inflation at moderately
high rates of, say, 50 percent per year. Either there must be an effort to
J/ See Fischer and Modigliani (1978) and Fischer (1981).
2/ Our seignorage measure, which follows Fischer (1982), is change in
reserve money, line 14 in IFS. This measure somewhat overstates true
seignorage since we are neglecting the real costs of maintaining the
monetary system, the cost of coinage, and the cost printing and replacing
paper money. A better seignorage estimate would adjust for such costs to
find the real revenue created by the monetary authority for use in other
government activities.
The samples used in constructing Figure 4 and the corresponding
figure in the appendix, Figure A2, are presented in appendix Tables A1-A4.
Countries for which IFS data is not available since 1960 or for which there
are other data problems in IFS are not included in our report.
/ The relationship between inflation and seignorage will be different,
even over longer periods, between countries depending in the country's
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drive inflation back down at least to the lower doubl,e digits on an annual
basis, or there appears to be a tendency for inflation to escalate well into
the double digits on a monthly basis. Economies that fall into this latter
category really have no meaningful nominal anchor. The remainder of this
paper shall not be concerned with such economies, but only with econoudis
that have achieved at least some reasonable nominal stability as measured by
the longer-term average inflation rate.
For countries that do maintain a meaningful nominal anchor in the
form of arelativelylow longer-term inflation rate, seignorage revenue from
money creation is in general a quite small fraction ofCDPand of total
government revenue. Even for such countries, seignorage is not necessarily
a trivial concern. However, it is difficult to see that the generation of
seignorage, within a scheme of minimizing the distortionary effects of the
government's entire scheme for revenue generation, as the dominant concern
in determining the longer-term inflation rate. In particular, it strains
credulity to attempt to argue that the general increase of inflation rates
in industrial countries during the l970s was motivated primarily by a
calculated effort to counterbalance increases in the marginal distortionary
effects of other forms of raising government revenue through taxation by
increasing the rate of the inflation tax. Correspondingly, it is difficult
to see the general reduction of inflation during the past decade in a
reverse m_anner from the perspective of the determination of the inflation
rate within the theory of public finance. Rather, it seems necessary to
look elsewhere, to broader concerns about the conduct of monetary policy, to
seek a plausible explanation for the determination of the longer-term
average inflation rate.
IV. Stabilization Policy and Inflation
From our earlier examination of Figure 1 it is evident that U.S. and
U.K. price levels behaved differently before and after the period
surroundingWWII. Accordingto Klein (1975) and Friedman and Schwartz
(1982) the role of monetary policy changed fundamentally during the period
just following the War. Before the War monetary policy was primarily
responsible for maintaining the fixed nominal anchor, but after the War
monetary policy assumed part of the responsibility for economic
stabilization. The relationship between monetary policy, inflation and
economic activity has been the subject of a truly enormous literature.
Instead of trying to cover the whole field we will first review briefly the
case for using monetary policy to stabilize the real economy and then
concentrate on the two developments that helped shape recent work in this
area, the appreciation of importance of expectations and the appreciation of
the role of policy rules. As applications of these two developments we then
examine briefly the performance of a selection of monetary policy rules
directed toward various nominal anchors in multi-country models. Finally we
discuss temporary versus more-permanent policy rules including an exposition
of how well-informed and very well-financed private speculators can force a
policy crisis.- 10-
1. The case for monetary stabilization of the real economy
At least since the work of Keynes (1936), macroeconomists have tended
to be divided into two broad groups: those who favor active policy
intervention to attempt to stabilize the real economy on a more or less
continuous basis; and those who generally oppose such intervention except
perhaps in limited instances. In general, the more interventionist group
may be a little more tolerant of a higher average rate of inflation or, put
slightly differently, may be a little more anxious to avoid the short-term
costs of reducing inflation. The noninterventionist group, on the other
hand, may generally be somewhat more concerned about the economic costs of a
higher average inflation rate. The main difference between the two groups
concerns, however, the role and usefulness of monetary policy as
counter-cyclical policy tool.
In the most recent phase of this debate the groups have also tended
to be separated by. technical issues of economic modeling. The
noninterventionists have focused to a considerable extent on "real business
cycles," that is on viewing business cycles as the natural result of real
disturbances to tastes and technology affecting a competitive economic
system with flexible prices and wages. From the perspective of
equilibrium-business-cycle models, there is little that monetary policy can
do to affect the behavior of the real economy; and, accordingly, there is
little or no useful role for interventionist monetary policy to attempt to
stabilize the real economy. Jj In contrast1 the more interventionist
group has focused more on "nec-Keynesian" models of business cycles that
feature various market imperfections and frictions, especially sticky wages
and prices, assorted liquidity phenomena or missing markets for product or
j/The equilibrium business-cycle group, which is based on Kydland and
Prescott (1982), and King and Plosser (1984) argues that the observed
correlation between the business cycle and various monetary measures is due
to monetary accommodation of real shocks in order to stabilize interest
rates. A simple way to think about this view is in terms of a money market
equilibrium that depends on real money balances, the nominal interest rate
and real output. A real output shock, say positive, increases the demand
for money and would require a price level movement combined with an interest
rate movement unless the monetary authority accommodates the real shock by
increasing the money supply to preserve monetary equilibrium at an unchanged
interest rate and unchanged price level.- 11-
labormarket information. j/ The essential idea is that these
imperfections and frictions give monetary policy some significant bite in
influencing the real economy. Accordingly, many who adopt the neo-Keynesian
perspective argue that there is a good deal that monetary policy can and
should do to stabilize the real economy in the face of both nominal and real
shocks that would otherwise cause significant and undesirable departures
frommedium-term macroeconomic equilibrium.
Because our purpose is to study a variety of important issues
concerningthe use of monetary policy for stabilization purposes that have
been developed in the macroeconomics literature, in this discussion we adopt
important elements of the neo-Keynesian perspective- -at least to the extent
that we assume that there are mechanisms through which monetary policy might
have a meaningful influence onthebehavior of the real economy. At the
outset, however, we emphasize that the assumption of a capacity for such
influence does not automatically imply that monetary policy can be used
successfully for economic stabilization. Indeed, many of the more
traditional monetary economists who have opposed activist monetary policies
have done so not because of any doubt of the real influence of monetary
policy, but rather because of considerable doubt about the ability to use
this influence systematically in a constructive manner.
This critically important point can be illustrated with a variety of
models that allow a meaningful role for monetary policy in influencing the
real economy. Most of these models r'iare essential common elements and end
up providing broadly similar rationates for stabilization policy. The key
ingredient is usually some form of (temporary) nominal price or wage
rigidity that allows quantities to adjust to purely nominal disturbances.
These quantity adjustments may be the best responses available for
individual decision makers, but are distinctly inappropriate from the
economy-wide perspective. The idea is that the best response to a nominal
disturbance would beaprice response, but with prices harder to move than
quantities, individuals make socially-undesirable quantity responses. In
2/Modelswith sticky wages and prices form the underpinnings of many
large-scale macro models such as those discussed below. Rational
expectations were introduced to this part of the literature by Azariadis
(1975), and Taylor (1977). Ackerloff and Yellin (1985) and Mankiw (1985)
present more recent work in this tradition. While product and labor markets
are the historical favorite preserves for nominal rigidities, some other
work concentrates on rigidities and information problems in credit markets,
e.g., Blinder and Stiglitz (1983), Bernanke and Certler (1987).
An essentially equivalent sort of rigidity is postulatedby Lucas
(1972). In his work, Lucas develops an information-based monetary business
cycle, where adhocinformation differences play the same sort of role as
sticky wages or prices or credit-market problems. The point of all of this
work is to develop theories that depart from the complete-markets
competitive-equilibrium paradigm and allow nominal disturbances to influence
realdecisions,- 12-
thesemodels, monetary policy clearly can play a useful role in stabilizing
real output by offsetting other nominal disturbances that would otherwise
cause undesirable real output fluctuations. More generally, if there are
real shocks to aggregate demand that arise from nonmonetary sources, but
would cause undesirable fluctuations in output, then monetary policy can act
to offset (at least partially) the undesirable real effects of these shocks.
Shocks can also occur, however, on the supply side of the economy,
for which the economically desirable response is an adjustment of quantities
as well as of prices. If monetary policy is used to offset such shocks, the
result may be a reduction, rather than an improvement, in economic welfare.
Of course, if it is possible to know the nature of the shock affecting the
economy and respond in a timely and appropriate manner, then interventionist
monetary policy should be a force for good. However, the information
requirements for this situation to prevail in practice may not usually be
met. If, because of lack of adequate information, monetary policy focuses
invariably on the stabilization of output, then the results are likely to be
beneficial (on average) only if the shocks affecting output are primarily on
the demand side. Also, as a practical matter of great importance, monetary
policy appears to affect the real economy only with a considerable and
somewhat unpredictable lag. This significantly complicates and limits the
potential usefulness of monetary policy in attempting to correct even
demand-side disturbances of limited magnitude and duration.
With this general background, it is useful now to turn to two
specific developments that have helped shape monetary-policy literature in
recent years.
2. The imvortance of expectations
It has long been recognized that expectations about future economic
developments exert an important influence on current economic behavior.
With the shift away from nominal anchors that provided long-run stability of
the price level, to nominal stability measured in terms of positive long-run
inflation rates, the issue of inflationary expectations gained increasing
importance in discussions of the effects of monetary policy. Through the
l960s, much of the analysis of monetary policy and its role in macroeconomic
stabilization used a variety of econometric models that generally assumed
some form of "adaptive expectations." In this approach, it was assumed that
expectations about future inflation (and about some other relevant
variables) were formed by taking backward-looking weighted average of past
experience and adjusting expectations partially in response to deviations of
new data from this backward-looking weighted average. Such a
backward-looking approach to the modelling of expectations was appropriate
during times of policy stability, when the evolution of variables like the
inflation rate was reasonably well described as an evolutionary and adaptive
process.
During the 1970s, however, it came to be recognized that this
backward-looking approach to expectations formation could prove seriously- 13-
misleading,especially in evaluating different possible regimes for the
conduct of monetary policy for purposes of macroeconomic stabilization.
Specifically, if expectations of inflation were inevitably backward-looking,
then it appeared, from many standard macroeconomic models, that a policy of
continually accelerating the rate of money creation and hence the rate of
price inflation could induce a permanent increase in the level of output
above its normal equilibrium level. This was the so-called accelerationist
controversy, which was a major focus of Milton Friedman's (1968)
Presidential Address to the American Economic Association.
In that address Friedman argued in favor of the idea that there was
no permanent trade-off between higher inflation and lower unemployment and
that any effort to continually accelerate the inflation rate to exploit a
possible short-run trade-off would be defeated by the forward-looking
adjustment of expectations to take account of such acceleration. An
essential idea that was introduced in Friedman's thinking and in other
macroeconomic theorizing at that time was the "expectations-augmented
Phillips curve1" which we represent formally as:
y — - .pX)+u ,$ >0, 0 < 1 1 (1)
where y is the level of output, w is the inflation rate, ir is the
anticipated rate of inflation and u is a residual that captures all aspects
of aggregate supply not captured elsewhere. j/
The accelerationist controversy may be characterized in terms of
modeling & and setting y.InFriedman's original work, y— 1and
expectations are forward looking; implying that there is no way to induce,
on average over the longer-term, a divergence between the actual and the
expected inflation rate. If inflationary expectations were necessarily
adaptive and backward looking or if y <1, however, then by pushing the
inflation rate to progressively higher levels, it should be possible to
induce a permanent divergence between actual and expected inflation. This
would imply the possibility that accelerating inflation could produce a
long-term output gain.
Solow (1969) and Cordon (1969), assuming adaptive expectations,
produced econometric estimates ofbelow unity and thus it appeared
Jj Friedman's argument was presented in terms of the relation made
popular by A.W. Phillips (l9SB) in which he related U.K. unemployment to the
rate of change of the U.K. nominal wage. The disturbance ii may be regarded
as bringing composed, in part, by the errors made in converting from wages
to prices and from unemployment to output.
For present purposes we allow u to incorporate all predetermined
aspects of current-output determination.- 14-
initiallythat steady inflation could result in a long-term output gain.
Later work by Sargent (1971), who assumed rational expectations, found yto
be insignificantly different from one. Operationally, rational expectations
means that the individuals being modeled form their anticipations as
mathematical expectations based on information concerning private and
government behavior in the model at hand.
Introduction of the assumption of rational expectations into many
standard macroeconomic models tuned out to have dramatic implications.
Specifically, returning to equation (1), replace w by En, where E is the
mathematical expectation operator. Now, since y —1,the term involving
current magnitudes affecting y involves only it- En.Withexpectations
formed rationally, this difference must correspond exclusively to the
unexpected part of (or surprise in) the inflation rate. This implies that
monetary policy can influence output only by creating a surprise in the
inflation rate. As a minimal requirement of rationality, given a
veil-understood regime for the conduct of monetary policy, such surprises
should average out to be zero.
Moreover, the appearance of this term clarifies the possible role for
monetary policy. In particular, monetary policy is effective in influencing
output only to the extent that such policy can influence inflation
surprises. Policy can stabilize the real economy, therefore, only if
policymalcers can engineer appropriate private-sector inflation surprises.
Government monetary policy actions that are understood and fully expected by
the private sector are, by definition, not a surprise in relation to the
information used to form En and therefore do not influence output. This is
the famous policy ineffectiveness result first proposed by Sargent and
Wallace (1975).
This result, however1 does not mean that monetary policy can have no
systematic effect on the behavior of output; it just means that to have an
effect the government must have an information advantage. .J In
particular, it is consistent with the Sargent and Wallace result that
policies based on current information that was unavailable to private
decision makers when they formed their expectations can influence the
amplitude of business-cycle fluctuations. 21
In our consideration below of various nominal-anchor policies we will
adopt rational expectations and we will study models that are consistent
with the Sargent and Wallace result. The policies that we study influence
11 Formally, the policy must be based on information that is not
available to individuals when forming Er. In many models En is based on
information from time t-l, so that variables from time tcaninfluence
output.
21 To trace out the full business-cycle results of an inflation surprise
would require that we specify fully the dynamics of the residual u, which is
outside the scope of the current discussion.- 15-
thevolatility of shocks to output due to a government information
advantage. 1/
3. Policy rules
How do we go about modeling and evaluating hypothetical economic
policy? The type of formal analysis of economic policy that is currently
popular was introduced to macro-analysis by Poole (1970) who studied how to
set monetary policy optimally in a simple 15-11 model. At the time Poole
wrote1 the IS-tM structure was the standard for studying output and interest
rate outcomes of particular policy actions. Poole's innovation was to shift
attention from particular outcomes of policy actions to the properties of
the distributions of the variables of interest to policymakers, such as mean
and variance of inflation, output or unemployment. In particular, Poole
studied how the joint distribution of output and the nominal interest rate
were influenced by the stance of monetary policy. In Poole's work, a policy
was not a particular movement of a policy-controlled variable it was a
systematic rule for setting that variable. 2/
Poole's methods have become popular because they allow researchers to
model policy from outside the actual policymaking environment. In
particular, these methods give policymakers a specific set of rules for
policy and then allow the researcher to study how well, on average, a model
economy adopting these rules would perform. While Poole's work established
a role and a method for the study of monetary rules it did not build a case
for why actual policy should be conducted in accord with predetermined rules
rather than on a discretionary basis in response to actually realized events
and its to this problem that we turn next.
Is it better for policymakers to respond to events according to &
preset list of instructions as in Poole (1970) or should they maintain the
freedom to react to events as they are realized? There is an extensive
literature on this issue, which demonstrates, in theory, the potential gains
to an economy that come from having the monetary authority adopt a set of
policy rules rather than act at their own discretion to stabilize the
economy.
The basic ideas in the rules-versus-discretion literature were used
first in the macroeconomic setting by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo
(1978) to help understand inflation in post-WWII industrial countries. The
idias were subsequently popularized by Barro and Gordon (l983a, b).
Crucial to the results in these models is the notion that distortions
in the economy may lead private and public goals to diverge and thus the
j/ See Henderson and McKibbin (1993) on the role of expectations in the
wage-price sector of large-scale econometric models.
2/ The rules Poole studied were a rule that fixed the interest rate and a
rule that fixed the money supply.- 16-
publicfinance and political economy considerations we mentioned in
Section II may need to be supplemented. In the models1 the government
prefers a higher level of real activity than does the private sector. This
may result, for example, if the private sector is distorted by an income tax
to over-consume leisure activities. In the models, the real distortion is
immutable and the only method available to the monetary authority to induce
additional real activity is to surprise the private sector with unexpectedly
high inflation, as in equation (1). Even though the government also
dislikes inflation, a large enough divergence in basic goals will lead the
government to tolerate some inflation in order to induce additional real
activity. Understanding the monetary authority's motives and options, the
private sector is aware that the government will attempt a surprise
inflation unless the inflation rate is driven so high that it no longer is
worthwhile for the government to attempt such a surprise.
If the private sector and the government could get together and
cooperate they could arrange a noninflationary equilibrium that would
improve social welfare. But the way the models are setup the two sides
cannot get together and the only way the private sector can be confident of
their expectations of government behavior is when the inflation rate is
driven so high, on average, that the government's valuation of the activity
gains from an inflation surprise exactly balance the costs associated with
the additional inflation. The equilibrium that results, therefore, is an
inflationary one with the inflation perfectly anticipated and producing no
activity gains.
In this literature the noncooperative interaction that develops
between the private and public sectors is known as a game and this game's
equilibrium results in the government attempting to trick the private sector
into producing more, but in the end only damaging the economy with excessive
inflation. One answer to this type of problem is for the private sector to
closely proscribe government actions so that the government is effectively
prohibited from playing policy games. What is often recommended in this
literature is that the government behave according to simple easy-to-monitor
rules and in the next subsection we will review some simulations of such
rules.
We recognize that our attention to fixed rules is very far from the
immediately-relevant type of question that policymakers must ask themselves
on a day-to-day basis, which is essentially: "What should be done today?"
At first we will proceed as if the answer is always "Follow the rule.'
After the next subsection we will expand our discussion to recognize the
possibility that rules may be abandoned temporarily during exceptional
circumstances.
4. Specific policy rules evaluated in multi-country models
Our aim here is to try to find out how many of the major economies
would behave if their monetary authorities followed some specific moving
nominal anchor policies. Of course, in economics there is never really an- 17-
opportunityto conduct controlled experiments on actual economies in order
to sort out the performance of policy alternatives, Instead economists
construct econometric models from historical data, build the policy
alternatives into the models and then hope that the altered models behave as
history would have behaved had the policies actually been followed. Such
experiments are called policy simulations. If economists had great
confidence in their models then they might also have confidence in the
results. Unfortunately such is not the case.
In fact there are a large number of carefully-constructed models
built by different groups, using the same historical data that are really
quite different from each other. While each modeling group may have
confidence in its own work, it is likely that each group is equally
confident that other models are lacking in various ways. In view of such
doubts, rather than report the results of policy simulations in one
particular economic model we use the approach recommended by McCallum
(1988), which is to report the results of policy simulations across a wide
range of state-of-the art models. ]'/ The work that we draw on here is
that reported by Bryant. looper and Mann (1993), BUM, where nine multi-
country econometric models were asked to simulate the effects of adopting a
actofmonetary policy rules. 2/Therules studied are:(1) a money
targeting rule; (2) a nominal income targeting rule; (2a) a combination
inflation and real output targeting rule; and (3) an exchange rate targeting
rule. The precise rules that the various modelling groups were asked to
study are:
(Regime 1) RS - — -5log 4/)
(Regime2A) RS- RS—-1.5log ((PY)/(fl]
(Regime 2B) RS -RS—-1.5t(rt -4) +lag (Y/1t)]
(Regime 3) PS -R4 — 2.5log
where
RS —theshort-ten nominal interest rate measured in percentage
points per year divided by 100
N —themonetary base (or some other narrow monetary aggregate)
P —theprice level (ClIP or OP deflator)
Y —realClIP or CDP
j/ We are, of course, not protected if all of the models make the same
sort of error.
2/Themodels that participated in this study are listed in the
Appendix.-18-
iv—therate of inflation in the price level P (expressed as
percent per year)
S —thenominal exchange rate, measured in U.S. dollars per unit
of local currency
and where an asterisk superscript (*) denotes a target (baseline)
value. j/ The baselines are country-specific and are discussed in RH!'!.
The specific rules that are studied were chosen because of their
relevance to actually-used or proposed rules. The money targeting rule
(Regime A) is similar in form to the type of monetary targeting reported in
Isard and Rojas-Suarez (1986). which studies monetary targeting in major
industrial countries in the period 1975-85. The nominal income targeting
rule (Regime 2A) is similar to the types of rules studied by McCallum (1986)
and by Hall and Mankiw (1993) for the United States. Regime 2B, which
targets a combination of inflation and the level of real output is pursued
as a possibly relevant variant of Regime 2A. In regime ZR equal weight is
given to deviations of inflation from its baseline and deviations of
output-growth from its baseline. Regime 3 is designed to smooth exchange
rate fluctuations and mimics exchange rate smoothing by major
countries. 2/
Thesimulations work as follows. First the models are estimated
country-by-countryand behavioral parameters are taken to be invariant to
changes in policy. The properties of the residuals from the estimated
equationsset the stochastic structure (the variance-covariance matrix) for
shocks in the simulations. Second, the regime-specific equations for
short-term interest rates replace previously relevant interest rate
equations for all countries. In other words, if one country adopts, for
example, a nominal income anchor, all countries adopt similar anchors.
Third, the model produces a simulated history built around the new policy by
drawing new disturbances whose stochastic properties are similar to the
historical ones. V
J./8HZ'!were very specific with respect to units because the policy rules
are specified as semi-log linear ones in which the parameters are not units
free.
2/Thisrule is actually set up to mimic a •loose" version of the Bretton
Woods. system since the United States is assumed to target its money supply
while all other countries target their exchange rates relative to the United
States.
VThesimulations match the first two moments of unpredicted residuals,
mean, and variance-covariance matrix. The predicted portion of the
residuals are modeled using various time-series techniques with the results
taken to be policy invariant. This approach ignores higher moments, which
could be important if loss functions were asymmetric.- 19-
Themodels are simulated assuming the individuals being modeled have
rational expectations and understand government policy sufficiently well so
that expectations are correct on average. This implies that what is being
simulated is a sort of steady position that the economy would come to if the
relevant policy had been in place for some time. No attempt is being made
to simulate the transition from one policy to another.
The actual simulations changed the suggested rules slightly to fit
the structure of the models being used. Table 1, which is taken directly
from BUM, reports one aspect of the results of the simulations. The table
reports the regime, for each country and each model that provides the best
performance of the indicator of interest. The left-hand column of the table
lists countries and characteristics of simulated series for the countries in
question. The first entry in the column, for example, is for the United
States and it is "Loss: Real GNP alone." What this means is that the model
characteristic that is being compared across regimes is the minimization of
average surprises in real U.S. CNP. j/ In column 2 of the table, which
gives the results for the GEM model it is reported that Regime 28X
minimizes this measure of real-output variance. The "X" attached to regime
28 in 28X means that simulations of the GEM model changed rule 28 to be
compatible with the GEM model. BHM report the model-specific rule changes.
Rules 2A and 28, the nominal income targeting rule and the variant on
the nominal income rule, which targets inflation plus real output
out-perform money targeting and exchange rate targeting by a wide margin.
with the two nominal income variants producing a better loss-function value
around 80 percent of the time. From the reported results there is little to
choose from between the nominal-income-based rules, 2A and 28, which perform
best about an equal number of times.
The results of this section are clear. In a wide variety empirically
based open-economy models, monetary policy rules that are directed toward
some version of nominal income stabilization perform better in terms of
output stability and inflation stability in realistic simulations than do
rules based on stabilizing exchange rates or money supplies. While
confidence in any single simulation model may be low, it is noteworthy that
the models have similar results and that these results match those obtained
by McCallum (1988) and Hall and Mankiw (1993) in single-economy simulations.
5. Specific monetary policy rules are temporary
The previous subsection evaluated specific rules based on the
assumption that the rules would last Indefinitely. In practice,
price-fixing regimes and some other nominal anchors for monetary policy are
temporary as demonstrated, for example, by the ending of past gold
standards, the abandonment of fixed Bretton Woods parities and the frequent






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































central-paritychanges in the EMIl. Recent research has begun to trace out
the implications of such impermanence for the behavior of private
individuals and governments. Most of this work starts from the basic idea
that when a government targets a specific market price as a nominal anchor
for monetary policy, stabilizing that nominal price is not the government's
primary policy goal. If a government adopts a fixed exchange rate, for
example, then it is understood that if the fixed exchange rate gets in the
way of other, more important, policy goals then the fixed rate will be
abandoned. This literature also shows that it may be desirable ,even
in light of the rules-versus-discretion issues studied above, for the
government to abandon a policy rule in some situations.
This literatures application to price-fixing regimes began with the
work of Salant and Henderson (1978) and Krugman (1979) who showed how the
collapse of a government price-fixing regime can be a natural economic event
based on economic fundamentals and devoid of expected profit opportunities.
Krugman's example involved a crisis in a fixed exchange rate regime, which
is developed as a privately-driven transition from a fixed exchange rate
regime to a flexible one. In Krugman's work the timing of a crisis for a
fixed exchange rate rule and its collapse is determined by speculators
pursuing profit opportunities. It is the competition among speculators that
determines the timing of a crisis and removes expected profit opportunities
from the crisis. In this sort of lodel, as speculators see the crisis
approaching they attempt to borrow large quantities of the currency whose
devaluation is suspected, convert the borrowed funds into foreign exchange
and then repay in terms of a devalued currency. Even without a government
interest rate defense, short-tens market interest rates can be driven to
levels unheard of in normal times. Krugman-style modeling of an exchange
rate crisis is based on speculators having unlimited access to short-term
credit markets, which describes well the available markets for industrial
countries but may overstate market access in some controlled
developing- country financial markets.
Following Krugman's work, it came to be recognized that a crisis
precipitated by economic fundamentals was not the only crisis that could be
explained in the context of the Krugman-style model. It was shown that if
the crisis caused a fundamental change in government policy then the crisis
could be triggered by a speculative whim and validated by the very policy
change it triggered. In other words, instead of a fundamentals-driven
event, the crisis and the attack could be just one of a multiciplicity of
possible outcomes with the exchange rate regime surviving, or not, as
dictated by speculative fancy. 21
j/ Judgemental language in this section, e.g., "desirablt" 'ideal,"
"valuable," should be interpreted in terms of the standard Barro and Gordon
(l983a,b) loss functions.
V This multiplicity was noted by Flood and Garber (1984) in the context
of a gold-price fixing model and was applied to exchange rates by Obstfeld
(1986).- 22-
Modelsof crises in government price-fixing rules are all based on
the idea that price fixing is not the government's primary objective and
that the resources the government is willing to commit to price fixing are
limited, If a government's commitment to a nominal price of any asset or
commodity in units of its own currency is absolute then it is unquestioned
that the price target can be preserved and speculation against the fixed
price would be futile. If the commitment is limited, however, then
well-financed speculators can provoke a crisis in the system and have the
incentive to do so when economic fundamentals are inconsistent with the
policy or when the crisis itself provokes a change in the basic stance of
government policy.
The implications of temporariness of other policies is explored in
models of policy rules with an escape clause, where it is recognized that
inflexible monetary-policy rules, such as those studied in the Last section,
do nothave the ring-of-truth in the sense that itis almost unimaginable
thatcentralbankers would consult a mathematical rule in a time of crisis
in the financial system. J The point developed here is that following a
monetaryrulemay not be ideal all of the time, even accounting for the
rules-versus-discretion issues as outlined above. In particular, while
following a rule may be ideal, on average, during "normal" times, society
may benefit from having the policyaker abandon the rule in exceptional
circumstances and confront events as warranted bythe situation at
hand.2/ The lesson from this work is that following a rule can be
valuable even if the rule must be abandoned temporarily during extraordinary
situations.
The formal study of policy temporariness is in its infancy but two of
its lessons for policy design are clear already. First, in existing models,
less than complete government commitment to a price-fixing target can bring
powerful speculative forces to bear that may provoke a crisis and end or
modify the price-fixing policy. The real-world relevance of this
theoretical point is illustrated by the European Currency Crisis of 1992 and
the changes in European Monetary Union's exchange rate arrangements provoked
by that crisis. Second, while it is hard to imagine actual central
bankers seriously consulting a mathematical rule before setting policy, it
iseasier to thinkof a monetary policy rule as being modeling shorthand for
policymakers systematically checking on a set of widely available indicators
of the state of the economy with different rules then being different
weighting schemes for actions responding to the various indicators. With
this broad interpretation of a rule, the rules-versus-discretion literature
simply recommends keeping the weighting schemes constant and making them
Jf See Flood and Isard (1989), and Persson and Tabellini (1990).
2/ Notice in Figure 1 that commodtty standards were abandoned in wartime
but later reinstituted and recall that the Bretton Woods fixed parities
could be adjusted for "fundamental disequilibrium.
See Goldstein et al. (1993).- 23-
publicduring normal times responding differently only during times of
crisis.
V. $tmsuarv and Conclusions
Our selective nominal anchors survey has reached three broad
conclusions. First, post-WWII industrial countries have moved from a
commodity standard to an inflation standard and maintaining reliably and
reasonably low inflation requires that seignorage as a percent of CDI'
usually be kept below one to two percent. Second, when we studied the
results of particular rules for monetary policy, it was found that rules
targeting nominal income out-perform rules targeting the money supply or the
exchange rate in large-scale econometric models when performance is measured
in terms of the stability of inflation and stability of output growth.
Third, through actual examples sad guided by the template of economic theory
we saw that anything less than a government's full commitment to a
price-fixing policy in models with realistic capital markets can end in a
privately-engineered crisis.
Finally, it should be emphasized that in the actual conduct of
monetary policy, governments and central banks do not generally behave in a
manner that can easily be summarized in a mathematical equation. Almost
always, some degree of judgement is exercised by a country's monetary
authority. Nevertheless, the conduct of monetary policy is not random and
undisciplined; it is governed by reasonably well-defined objectives, in the
context of a broad understanding of how monetary policy affects the real
economy, the financial system, and the price level. In the end, it is the
fact that there is something systematic about the conduct of monetary
policy, and about its effects, that allows economic analysis to shed some
light, at least potentially, on the effects of alternative monetary policies
in supplying a nominal anchor f or the economic system. The practical
importance and implications of any such analytical exercise, of course, need
to be interpreted with an appropriate degree of caution.- 24- APPENDIX
From BHM pp. 20-21.
GEM: Aversion of the Global Economic Model developed by
the National Institute for Economic and Social
Research (NIESR) in London and jointly maintained with
the London Business School (LBS). Ray Barrell and
David Currie, working with colleagues from both the
NIESR and LBS, coordinated the model simulations
prepared for the project.
INTERNOD: A policy-simulation model originally developed by a
Canadian team under the direction of John Helliwell
(following the International Monetary Fund effort to
construct MULTIMOD), sponsored by the Canadian
Department of Finance and subsequently supported also
by the Bank of Canada. Two versions of the model were
used (see below). Guy Meredith and Mary MacGregor
managed the models for this project.
LIVERPOOL: The model developed by Patrick Minford and several
associates at the University of Liverpool.
MI'S: The model, primarily of the U.S. economy but also with
an external sector, developed by the domestic
divisions of the Federal Reserve Board (following
earlier work by teams of economists at MIT, the
University of Pennsylvania, and the Federal Reserve,
financed by the Social Science Research Council).
Flint Brayton and colleagues ran the simulations for
this project.
MSC: An updated version of a policy-simulation model
originally developed by Warwick McKibbin and Jeffrey
Sachs at Harvard University, run for the purposes of
this project by Warwick Mclcibbin at the Brookings
Institution.
MULTIMOD: The policy-simulation model developed in the Research
Department of the International Monetary Fund, managed
for this project by Paul Masson and Steven Symansky.
MX3: A policy-simulation model developed in the Division of
InternationalFinance of the Federal Reserve Board and
managed for this project by Joseph Cagnon and Ralph
Tryon.
TAYLOR: The multicounery policy-simulation model developed by
John Taylor and associates at Stanford University, run
for this project by Peter Kienow.- 25-
APPENDIX
table 2. Industrial and Other European Countries' Data Used in Charts
(US is lOOxChange inReserves as a Ratioto CD?.ItiP is mtladen in percent per Year)







States 0.33 2.25 0.50 1.10 0.38 5.26 0.40
United
Kingdom 0.44 3.24 0.81 12.63 0.20 7.19 0.46 7.39
Austria 1.08 3.04 0.99 6.10 0.44 3.71 0.80 4.18
Belgium 0.87 2.43 0.90 1.13 0.11 4.47 0.59 4.53
Denmark 0.62 4.66 0.22 9.29 0.33 5.86 0.39 6.43
France 1.08 4.98 0.68 8.92 0.30 6.33 0.65 6.61
Germany 0.64 225 1.02 4.89 0.56 3.02 0.73 3.29
Italy 2.38 3.04 3.03 12.45 1.53 10.14 2.24 8.36
Netherlands 0.7) 3.71 0.52 1.06 0.53 2.98 0.59 4.39
Norway 0.69 3.49 0.86 8.37 0.28 7.18 0.58 6.26
Sweden 0.50 3.57 0.95 8.57 0.48 7.81 0.63 6.57
Switzerland 1.95 2.70 1.55 6.98 0.03 3.69 1.07 3.72
Canada 0.38 2.41 0.68 7.38 0.20 5.92 0.40 5.14
Japan 1.23 4.51 1.26 9.09 0.55 2.57 0.97 5.10
Finland 0.26 4.89 0.40 10.41 0.70 6.62 0.48 7.11
Greece 1.82 1.94 2.71 12.31 3.06 19.28 2.58 11.34
Iceland 2.10 10.25 2.48 29.55 1.82 32.15 2.11 23.90
Ireland 1.30 3.70 2.66 12.75 0.49 7.92 1.33 1.86
Portugal 1.66 3.57 4.08 17.14 3.76 16.16 3.22 12.12
Spain 1.54 6.52 2,18 14.39 2.44 9.31 2.09 9.80
Australia 0.38 2.31 0.72 9.83 0.44 1.35 0.51 6.33
New Zealand -0.12 3.35 0.68 11.46 0.12 9.87 0.22 8.09
Europe
Cyprus 1.85 1.33 2.95 6.79 3.16 5.69 2.70 4.51

















* Observationsmay not be present in the charts for these countries, values were
too high.- 26-
Table3. Western Hemisphere and Middle East Countries Data Used in Charts
(RES si;niiics lOOx Chang, in Reserve. as a Ratio to CDI',


















3L16 11.49 132.94 6.91 628.26 7.23 282.02 Argentina* 3.30
BoIivia* 1.3? 7.21 1.96 15.90 6.97 1155.85 2.89 415.17
brazil' 3.83 42.74 1.99 30.54 3.92 583.36 3.31 240.06
ChIt. 2.21 26.28 8.76 174.56 10.00 21.30 7.27 66.80
HaIti 0.44 1.42 1.51 9.26 2.03 7.97 1.33 5.98
Mexico 0.68 3.69 LOB 14.68 3.51 58.10 2.52 26.97
Paraguay 1.01 4.90 2.26 11.08 2.36 21.71 1.90 12.91
Peru 1.13 9.86 2.49 26.51 6.87 98L92 3.71 376.03
Barbados 1.21 5.65 1.59 13.87 0.64 6.48 1.09 9.23
Colombia 135 ii 16 2.35 19.31 2.20 24.71 1.99 18.52
Costa Rica 0 1 1.88 2.11. 9.79 4.45 26.19 2.62ILU
Dominican Rp 0.87 0.90 143 9.20 2.25 25.74 1.58 12.50
Ecuador 0.99 3.56 2.63 11.87 2.10 37.81 1.86 18.66
cuatemala 0)/ 0'S, 1.66 8.86 1.20 15.78 1.03 8.54
Guyana 0.16 1.93 2.01 9.24 12.09 15.50 5.60 9.06
IIocduras 0,69 1.87 093 6.63 0.94 10.77 0.81 6.54
Jamaica 0.65 3.60 1.77 11.27 3.55 23.57 1.98 14.92
Trinidad/lob 0.214 . 3.07 1.86 11.66 0.37 .10.66 0.79 8.34
Uruguay 4.66 46,53 3.74 59.26 3.32 66.06 3.85 57.62
Venezuela 0.36 1.12 1,73 6.61 1.86 25.92 1.36 12.11
i1dd1e East
E6ypt 1.93 2.43 4.07 7.78 6.00 17.20 4.18 9.45
Israel 1.57 4.99 11.31 32.49 14.43 103.45 . 9.61 49.42
Saudi Arabia 1.20 1.99 2.80 12.67 0.30 0.56 1.38 6.96
Source: International Financial Statistic..
• Indicates that some observations for these countries may not be present in the charts
as th. values er. so hIgh, usually for inflation.- 21 APPENDIX
Tabl.e 4. african Countries Data Used in Charts
(RES signifies lOOxChangein Reserves as a Ratio to CDP1


















Congo 0.39 5.07 1.11 8.15 0.56 6.35 0.68 6.42
Ivory Coast 1.01 3.43 1.85 11.72 0.85 5.31 1.31 6.78
Ethiopia 0.54 0.26 1.41 10.42 3.16 7.49 1.89 7.50
Gabon 0.42 3.41 0.98 11.06 0.19 4.91 ).50 6.61
Gambia 1.33 1.74 4.29 9.63 1.57 15.77 Z.53 10.17
Ghana 0.87 9.29 3.99 38.84 2.43 42.16 2.43 35.10
Kenya 2.14 1.80 1.02 10.92 1.24 14.03 1.26 9.38
Madagascar 0.32 2.60 0.99 7.90 1.41 16.96 1.02 11.16
Mauritius 0.34 2.88 3.01 10.98 2.27 10.51 1.91 9.14
Morocco 1.05 2.39 2.00 7.79 1.63 7.35 L56 5.78
Niger 0.3? 4.02 0.99 10.35 0.75 1.74 0.74 5.18
Nigeria 0.39 2.49 1.68 15.61 2.12 22.14 1.41 13.18
Rwanda o:is 1.70 1.09. 12.46 0.20 6.18 0.62 8.06
Senegal -0.55 L04 1.07 9.19 1.19 5.20 0.69 6.78
Sierra Leone 0.65 2.73 1.54 10.83 5.03 10.04 2.65 30.04
South Africa 0.49 2.69 0.55 9.65 0.74 16.21 0.60 9.04
Sudan 0.85 3.29 2.40 15.34 5.96 51.43 3.25 24.61
Togo 0.66 1.33 1.55 9.52 3.86 4.32 2.04 6.04
Tunisia 0.87 2.13 1.43 5.24 1.12 8.09 1.14 5,24
Zambia 1.35 4.52 0.92 10.31 3.40 6L60
Source: International Financial Statistics.- 28 APPENDIX
Table 5. Asian Countries' Data Used in Charts
(RES signifies lOOx Change in Reserves as a Ratio to GD?.
















India 0.85 5.80 1.36 7.54 2.02 9.68 1.45 7.74
Indonesia 3.23 90.60 1.90 16.92 0.88 9.27 1.60 39.34
Korea 1.79 11.32 2.59 15.22 0.61 8.35 1.65 11.34
Malaysia 0.55 0.35 1.74 5.50 1.42 3.71 1.25 3.07
Myanmar 0.99 2.96 2.92 10.86 3.80 13.28 2.61 9.05
Nepal 1.00 5.06 0.96 7.81 2.03 11.49 1.40 9.03
Pakistan 1.30 3.05 2.20 11.76 2.23 7.61 1.94 7.27
Philippines 0.67 3.98 1.02 14.64 1.39 14.79 1.06 11.04
Singapore 1.37 1.18 2.48 6.56 1.61 2.85 1.86 3.54
Sri Lanka 0.91 204 1.32 6.89 USS 13.33 1.29 7.62
Thailand 0.84 1.94 1.20 8.00 0.97 5.69 1.00 5.06
Source; International Financial Statistics.— 28a—
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